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Introspection and Intuition
A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel
Tim Bayne
This paper is a response to Maximilian H. Engel’s commentary on my target pa-
per, in which I provided a critical examination of pessimism accounts of the trust-
worthiness of introspection. Engel’s focuses on the distinction that I drew between
two kinds of introspective judgments, scaffolded judgments and freestanding judg-
ments, and suggests that this distinction might fruitfully illuminate the epistemo-
logy of intuitive judgments. I present some doubts about whether the distinction
can be transferred to intuition in this way, and also sketch a more fundamental
contrast between introspective judgments and intuitive judgments. 
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1 Introduction
Let me begin by thanking Maximilian H. Engel
for his commentary. I take the heart of his pa-
per to consist in the suggestion that the distinc-
tion between freestanding and scaffolded judg-
ments  which  Maja  Spener  and  I  (Bayne &
Spener 2010) developed in connection with in-
trospection can be usefully applied to the epi-
stemology of intuition. I will start by revisiting
the  freestanding/scaffolded  distinction,  before
turning to Engel’s proposal. 
The epistemology of introspection is that
it is not flat but contains peaks of epistemic se-
curity alongside troughs of epistemic insecurity.
Any attempt to understand the epistemology of
introspection needs to take this landscape into
account, for although our pretheoretical  views
concerning the epistemology of introspection are
not sacrosanct they do form a useful constraint
on theorizing about introspection. Any account
of introspection should explain why some intro-
spective  judgments  strike  us  as  highly  secure
whereas others seem to be insecure. 
This is where the distinction between scaf-
folded  and  freestanding  judgments  comes  in.
Both  types  of  judgments  have  as  their  inten-
tional objects current conscious states that one
takes oneself to be in. (The notion could also be
applied  to  judgements  concerning  the  states
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that one is not in.) An introspective judgment
is  scaffolded  when  the  subject  is  disposed  to
make  a  first-order  judgment  whose  content
bears a rough correspondence to that of the in-
trospective  judgment.  For  example,  the  judg-
ment  that  one  is  experiencing  a  red  light  in
front of one is scaffolded by the disposition to
judge that there is a red light in front of one,
whereas there is no such first-order disposition
corresponding  to  the  introspective  judgment
that one is merely imagining or thinking about
a red light. Experiences that are the intentional
objects of scaffolded judgments are themselves
employed  in  world-directed  first-order  judg-
ments, whereas that is not the case where free-
standing judgments are concerned. Contrary to
what Engel  suggests,  there is  no commitment
here to the idea that only scaffolded judgments
are epistemically trustworthy. The idea, rather,
is that scaffolded judgments have a certain kind
of first-person warrant that free-standing judge-
ments tend to lack. 
2 From introspection to intuition? 
Engel argues that the distinction between scaf-
folded and free-standing judgments can also be
applied to the kinds of judgments deployed in
debates about philosophical intuitions, and also
suggests that most such judgments—or at least,
those which are of central philosophical interest
—are best regarded as free-standing, and thus
lack the kind of warrant that we might want for
them. 
Although I welcome Engel’s attempt to ex-
tend the distinction between scaffolded and free-
standing judgments beyond the domain of intro-
spection, I am not convinced that it does much to
illuminate the epistemology of intuition. The first
issue that needs to be addressed is the fact that
intuitive judgments don’t form a single, well-be-
haved class. One kind of intuitive judgment that
is  of  philosophical  interest  concerns  the  modal
structure of the world, as when one judges that it
is necessarily true that 2+2=4 or that it is only
contingently  true  that  Aristotle  was  a  philo-
sopher. But as far as I can tell, Engel is not con-
cerned with intuitive judgments of this kind, but
with what we might call intuitions of concept ap-
plication. Such judgments are concerned with the
question of whether a certain concept (such as
<knowledge>) ought to be applied to a certain
state of affairs. 
In  explaining  how  the  contrast  between
scaffolded  and  free-standing  judgments  might
apply to intuitive judgments Engel writes:
Again  taking  the  intuition  about  know-
ledge,  what  makes  this  intuition,  even
though  not  universal,  so  astonishingly
stable among Western philosophers? I ar-
gue  that  this  is  due  to  the  close  match
between the content of the intuition (i.e.
“she  doesn’t  know!”)  and  the  rules  one
learns  to  use  [regarding]  the  concept  of
knowledge  in  our  cultural  niche  (i.e.:
“Only ascribe knowledge if a person is ap-
propriately justified in believing a proposi-
tion!”). So in the context of Western philo-
sophy,  the intuitive judgment can be re-
garded  as  a  scaffolded  and  thus  reliable
judgment. (this collection, p. 6)
It is certainly true that an individual’s use of a
concept is scaffolded by the practices of the cul-
ture in which they are embedded. As Kant poin-
ted out, we learn how to apply concepts by noting
how they are applied by those around us.  Kant
(A134/B174) described examples as the “Gängel-
wagen of  thought”,  where  a  Gängelwagen is  a
walking frame or go-kart that is harnessed to an
infant in order to help it learn to walk. But al-
though this form of support is indeed a kind of
scaffolding, it differs in important ways from the
kind of  scaffolding that I had in mind. In the
sense of the term that Spener and I had in mind,
a scaffolded judgment is a judgment that is un-
derpinned by a disposition to make a first-order
judgment who content roughly corresponds to the
content of the scaffolded judgments. As far as I
can see, intuitive judgments are not scaffolded in
this sense, in part because intuitive judgments are
already “first-order”.  So,  although I  would  cer-
tainly agree that the possession of such concepts
as <knowledge> is supported by one’s cultural
niche, it  doesn’t  follow that the intuitive judg-
ments about when it is and isn’t appropriate to
apply this concept are scaffolded.
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3 Intuitive disagreement
In closing, let me mention an important back-
ground issue concerning which Engel and I ap-
pear to have different views. Engel, I take it,
holds that the disagreement in intuitive judg-
ments regarding concept application should be
regarded as epistemically troublesome in much
the way that disagreement about introspective
judgment is regarded as epistemically trouble-
some. The idea is that in both cases there are
objective facts of the matter, and the existence
of widespread disagreement indicates that signi-
ficant numbers of individuals are systematically
mistaken about what those facts are. 
Although I am inclined to accept this dia-
gnosis when it comes to many introspective dis-
agreements, I do not find it particularly plaus-
ible when it comes to disagreements concerning
intuitions  of  concept  application.  Here’s  why.
Suppose  that  Weinberg  and  his  collaborators
are right when they suggest that low-socioeco-
nomic status individuals are disposed to apply
the  concept  <knowledge>  in  contexts  where
high-socioeconomic status (SES) individuals are
disposed to withhold it (Weinberg et al. 2001).
Would it follow (as Engel seems to assume) that
at least one of these groups is mistaken about a
matter  of  objective  fact?  I  don’t  think so.  It
seems to me more plausible to assume that low-
SES  subjects  and  high-SES  subjects  simply
have different concepts (or “conceptions”, if you
prefer) of knowledge, and each of them is apply-
ing its own concept correctly. The two concepts
are similar enough to be both associated with
the  single  word  “knowledge”,  but  there  is  no
case for regarding one of these concepts as su-
perior  to the other,  or for thinking that only
one of them truly captures the essence of know-
ledge. They are simply different concepts. 
If this is right, then apparent disagreement
between the judgments of low-SES subjects and
high-SES  subjects  about  whether  or  not  S
knows that P is not substantive in the way in
which most introspective disagreement appears
to be. Moreover, it seems to me that something
similar should be said concerning many (if not
all)  disputes  about  the  application  of  other
central  philosophical  concepts.  (One  needs  to
take the possibility of performance errors into
account here, but such problems will typically
be minimized in philosophical contexts.) But I
wouldn’t want to commit myself to this account
of  all intuitive disputes. In particular, it seems
to  me  that  introspective  disputes  concerning
modal matters are likely to to be substantive in
a way in which disagreements about intuitions
regarding concept application are not. 
4 Conclusion
In his commentary Engel suggests that the con-
trast  between scaffolded and freestanding judg-
ments that Spener and I applied to introspection
might also be usefully applied to intuition. Al-
though I welcome Engel’s attempt to extend the
distinction  between  scaffolded  and  freestanding
judgments beyond its original sphere of applica-
tion, I have suggested that such a move might not
be quite as straightforward as Engel takes it to
be, for there don’t appear to be any first-order
judgments that might scaffold intuitive judgments
in the way that first-order perceptual judgments
scaffold certain kinds of introspective judgments.
But although I  cannot  see how the distinction
between  scaffolded  and  freestanding  judgments
might apply to intuition, I certainly share Engel’s
conviction that “comparing and contrasting” the
epistemology of introspection with that of intu-
ition is a fruitful exercise, for both domains pose
the puzzle of how we might reconcile individual
certainty and apparent self-evidence with inter-
subjective disagreement.
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